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Abstract 
In the collective mind and even in than of some professionals, psychotherapy belongs to a field of strictly scientific 
specialisation, with empirically verifiable results, stemming from and confirmed by clinical practice. If that is the case, then 
philosophical speculations seem to be out of place here, as everything is based on techniques and procedures which can be tested 
and confirmed pragmatically. Our study sets out to highlight the philosophical commitment, which is sometimes implicit, other 
times explicit, but always present, of psychotherapeutic paradigms, a commitment which constitutes the very founding theoretical 
reasoning of the said practices. 
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1.Introduction 
 
The relationship between philosophy and science, in general, and philosophy and psychology, in particular, has 
known a certain historical dynamics. On the one hand, modern sciences, as we have come to define them today, 
have been born out of philosophical speculations the moment the maturation of the field reached the stages of 
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empirical testability. Newton still named his fundamental work The mathematical principles of natural philosophy 
(1687). The separation from philosophy starts to become more evident, as various fields start to demand autonomy 
and scientific independence. The same thing happens with psychology, which at the end of the 19th century claims 
its status as an empirical science, claiming its own field of research and a typical methodology for the investigation 
of facts. Still, psychology, maybe more so than any other science, continues to be marked by a certain philosophical 
view about the world. This fact is evident even in the case of psychotherapy, which is the most obvious domain for 
theoretical testing at the level of empirical practices. We will argue this idea with explicit references to the three 
major paradigms of modern psychotherapy: the psychoanalytic-dynamic approach, the existential-humanist one and 
the cognitive-behavioural approach.  
 
2. The relationships of the creators of the psychotherapeutic paradigms with philosophy 
 
A first clue, though not the most relevant, when it comes to the relation between psychology and philosophy, is 
the relationship of the creators of the paradigms to philosophy. 
The specific context for the creation and consolidation of psychology’s scientific status made that 
psychologists, even if aware of a philosophical lineage, denied it in public, so as not to compromise the status of the 
still young science as well as their own professional condition. Illustrative of this attitude is the stance of the father 
of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. 
From his biographer E. Jones (1970), we find that the young Viennese student of medicine comes in contact 
with systematic philosophy through Franz Bretano, by whose appointment he translates into German a volume of 
“The Collected Works” by J. St. Mill. In his private correspondence, Freud admits that in his youthful years he 
aspired “only to the philosophical knowledge”, also stating that he imagined philosophy as a “goal and refuge for 
old age”. On the other hand, in public, the creator of psychoanalysis carefully avoids any contact with actual 
philosophy, especially after at The World Health Care Congress held in London in August 1913, where  Pierre Janet 
maliciously claimed that psychoanalysis is first and foremost a form of philosophy, and proposes that its 
presentation be held in the quiet atmosphere of the Congress of Philosophy (Assoun, 1997). This explains why 
metapsychology, the founding theoretical part of clinical practice, appears as a epistemic construction that invokes 
data from clinical observations,  when in fact it stands on an unspoken philosophical project. The nucleus of 
Freudian philosophical references is represented by Schopenhauer, fact indirectly revealed: “Maybe you will say, 
shrugging your shoulders, states Freud <<But this is Schopenhauer’s philosophy of which you speak and not a 
scientific theory>>. And why, pray tell, ladies and gentlemen, the psychoanalyst continued, would a bold thinker not 
have guessed what the slow and dry observation that followed would later confirm.” (Freud , 1994:64). P.L. Assoun 
points out fifteen express references to Schopenhauer in Freud’s written work (Assoun,1997:192). Around 
Schopenhauer revolve other philosophers, primarily Plato, Kant and Nietzsche, but sporadically are brought about 
the names of Empedocles, Diderot and other philosophers. Freud’s tactic consists of the explicit employment of 
some philosophical ideas to enhance the dignity of his ideas and also to diminish the opposition of his 
contemporaries, while simultaneously distancing himself from philosophy, so as not to put in danger 
psychoanalysis’s scientific status. “Almost all of the specific ideas outlined in psychoanalysis, states Rollo May 
(2013, p.107), could be found explained in further details by Nietzsche, and more profoundly by Kierkegaard.” A 
similar stance is taken up also by M. Onfray, who states that “Freud is a philosopher who elaborates truths claiming 
to be universal, with the help of his intuition.” (2011, p.55), psychoanalysis being nothing else but “Freud’s 
philosophy” (Onfray, 2011, p.75).  
On the other hand, things change when it comes to the creators of existential and humanist psychotherapy.  
The initial exercise of delimiting psychology from philosophy with the purpose of publicly solidifying the idea of its 
pure scientific nature is not justified anymore. Psychology has earned the prestige of a scientific discipline, open to 
interdisciplinary dialogue. Humanist psychology, “the exuberant American relative” of existential psychotherapy 
(Yalom, 2012:24), opens the way for the use of philosophical ideas in the practice of psychotherapy, and 
psychology’s scientific status is no longer doubted for its use of such intuitions. The representatives of existential 
psychotherapy (Binswanger, 195, May, 2013, Frankl, 2008, 2012, Yalom,2013), openly admit their philosophical 
precursors, starting with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and going on with Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcus, Fromm, Sartre, 
Camus, Buber, Levinas etc., as well as their literary precursors, starting with Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy or Kafka.  
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Former psychoanalyst, Albert Ellis, regarded as “the grandfather of cognitive and behavioural psychotherapy” 
, “the father of emotional-rational and behavioural psychotherapy” and “the most influential psychotherapist alive” 
(David, 2006, p.43) admits philosophy’s influence, especially that of stoicism, Epicurean, Kantian and general 
semantics, having through his work the greatest nonclinical span with philosophical and cultural implications 
(David, 2003). 
As a result, the creators and representatives of psychotherapeutic paradigms have always had philosophy close, 
on which to draw their hypotheses of the empirical practice. 
 
3. Ontological assumptions 
 
Psychological paradigms and, implicitly, psychotherapeutic ones, are dependent upon a certain way of 
understanding the world and man. The most common problem of this type is the topic of determinism. The 
epistemic meta-narration of modern times has been dominated by the idea of determinism following the model of 
classical mechanics, by which all natural phenomena are completely determined, the universe being explained by 
chains of causes and effects. In such a cultural context, not even the psyche could get away from the implacable 
laws of the quasi-universal determination. For Freudian psychoanalysis, the functioning of the psyche is determined 
by unconscious factors, which can be precisely identified, and what appears to be inexplicable and accidental 
represents nothing more than Freudian slips which in turn have their own reason, being the expression of an integral 
determinism which lacks any cracks. In the case of Freudian slips and of dreams, the only thing that remains is to 
proceed to the hermeneutical approach of passing from the manifested content, seemingly random, to the latent one, 
with strict determination.  
The first half of the 20th century, especially as a result of the development of relativistic physics and quantum 
mechanics, introduces a crack in the universal determinism: the determination is no longer individual, but acts 
according to statistical patterns; there are quantum leaps and other phenomena which are not bound by the strict 
relationship of cause-effect. Thus, there is the possibility of randomly occurring phenomena and as such, human 
freedom has a place to fit in. For existentialism, man is “condemned to be free”, as Sartre puts it, and, as a 
consequence, is solely responsible for his situation. “The existential psychoanalysis” that Sartre is proposing rejects 
the causal explanation and the Freudian instinctive determinism, even if it accepts the important part which sexuality 
plays in the human existence (Sartre, J-P., 2004,  p.784-822).  As a result, for the representatives of the humanistic-
existential psychotherapy, freedom and the burden of the consequent responsibility constitute given fundamentals 
towards which the therapeutic enterprise is heading. 
From this perspective, behavioural cognitive psychotherapy is found between the two presuppositions, determinism 
and indeterminism. On the one hand it accepts the fact that the anxiety of the subject is being determined by the non-
adaptive cognitions, and on the other hand, it yields that the projection, the way in which the subject positions 
himself in view of the world depends solely on him. Restructuring the project is up to the subject’s free choice, and 
the dysfunctional cognitions can be replaced with functional ones. 
In May’s words (2013 , p.171), we can say that psychotherapy gradually opens itself up, from the world of 
determinations and biological drives (Umwelt), to the world of responsibilities towards others (Mitwell) and the 
world in which the individual can be aware of the destiny that he himself is making for himself (Eigenwelt). 
Following in the footsteps of M. Buber, E. Lévinas or P. Tillich, philosophical counselling makes a step forward, 
into the spiritual world. (Uberwelt) (van Deurzen, 1984).  
 
4. Anthropological assumptions 
 
A second issue with major implications on psychotherapeutic paradigms is the general view on man. 
4.1 Man – between the conscious and the unconscious. The 19th century questions the myth of the sovereign 
conscience, through various schools of thought: vitalistic (Schopenhauer), nihilistic (Nietzsche), evolutionist 
(Spencer), intuitionist (Bergson). For Freud, at the root of all psychic disorders lies the anxiety generated by 
unconscious conflicts. The psychic dominant is represented by the unconscious: man is an instinctual being, and at 
the origin of any human behaviour we are able to find a few fundamental drives. Even the highest human acts, the 
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most elevated creations of the spirit are nothing but reflexes, sublimations of drives at the core of which there is the 
implacable reign of the libido. Happiness is, in the end, nothing but a matter of libidinal economy (Lyotard, J. F., 
2001). In conclusion, for the psychoanalyst, man is but an animal capable to metamorphose the sex drive into an act 
of culture. 
In opposition to such a reductive view, humanist psychology (Rogers, C., 2008) re-establishes the dignity of the 
human being. Man no longer appears as a being exclusively determined by his own drives, but one who also has 
other needs and superior aspirations of achievement which can no longer be reduced to simple instinct. He must 
fight freedom more than drives. According to Sartre, the aim of existential psychoanalysis, that of ‘deciphering the 
empirical acts of behaviour of man’ (2004, p.544), can only be achieved by studying not only ‘the dreams, Freudian 
slips, obsessions and neuroses, but, mostly, one’s waking thoughts, successful and adapted acts, style etc.’ (2004, p 
762). 
From this viewpoint, cognitive-behavioural therapies start from the assumption that cognition is the most important 
determinant of emotional and psycho-behavioural responses, and the biggest part of psycho-pathology is the result 
of dysfunctional/irrational cognitions, which can be identified and changed through specific techniques of cognitive-
behavioural modifications by cognitive mediation (David, 2006, p. 49). 
 
4.2. Freedom – the fear of confronting the Being. If for the psychoanalytical determinism the topic of freedom is 
taboo, for existentialism freedom is the very defining note of the being-for-oneself and one of the fundamental 
worries for existentialist psychotherapy. The absence of an external reason makes man be completely responsible for 
what he is and will be, hence the fear of dealing with choices, the fundamental anguish, the bad conscience. On this 
topic, cognitive-behavioural therapies find themselves on the same place as existentialists, admitting the decisive 
part of the project in our life. 
 
4.3 The issue of the meaning of life and the fear of facing Nothingness. The matter of the meaning of life 
traditionally belongs to the metaphysical approach. Some philosophers have indicated grounds for rationally 
justifying a certain meaning of life connected to a certain value, knowledge, contemplation, virtue, love, pleasure, 
usefulness etc. Others doubt the existence of a rational foundation for accepting a meaning of life. According to 
these latter ones, life has no meaning, thus is absurd. ‘The age of wisdom’, as ‘age of resignation’ (Sartre, 1999, p. 
130) convinces you that to be is ‘to drink yourself without being thirsty’ (Sartre, 1999, p 56). Losing meaning 
generates anguish, and finding it again constitutes the support of personal balance. ‘People, states Frankl, have 
enough to live, but not to live for’ (V. Frankl, 2012, p 154). Anguish is part of our existence, nobody is exempt from 
it. Managing the brutality of the existential given of life, facing it, is painful, but eventually healing (Yalom, p. 23). 
In order to overcome the existential neurosis, caused by the awareness of finiteness, of isolation, of the burden of 
freedom and the lack of meaning of life, it takes responsibility, the Courage to be (Tillich, 2007) yourself, the 
courage to be together with your peers, the courage to be together with transcendence. 
 
 
5. Methodological consequences 
 
5.1. Psychotherapeutic temporality. The characteristics of anthropological assumptions make for particular 
methodological-therapeutic consequences, which favour a certain temporal ecstasis. To psychoanalysis, the past is 
the dominant temporal dimension. Psychic disorders stem from childhood experiences, to which we must return 
through various anamnestic techniques. The psychoanalyst is an archaeologist (Yalom, 2012), who releases the 
multiple layers of psychism, until reaching the basal level of the primary conflicts of the first childhood. 
Historically, the first layers of an individual’s life, retrospectively examined, are fundamental. From their 
perspective further meanings, complexes and feelings are then configured. The past buried as past explains current 
feelings, and bringing it to the light of conscience liberates the patient from his traumas. This is why the 
psychotherapist’s stand is no longer that of the archaeologist of the nocturnal unconscious, but that of the 
ophthalmologist of diurnal perception (Frankl, 2012, p.122), who attempts to widen the patient’s visual field, his 
conscience having become available at the perspective of the future. Man is not a being in itself, but for itself, a 
project which makes itself. Speech therapy focuses mostly on the future, so that the person becomes aware of the 
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whole spectrum of the potential sense. ‘The past is rather a back-up resource, in which we gather events and from 
which we select certain events in order to achieve our potentialities and to obtain satisfaction and security for the 
near future’ (May, R., 2013, p. 181). The future is the one determining the past, as what the patient chooses to 
remember is related to the way in which he looks into the future (May, 2013, p. 183, infra). 
To the existential psychotherapist, the method of empirical psychoanalysis must be applied, in reverse: if Freud 
made reference to the subject’s past while neglecting the future, this occurring simply as a determination of the past, 
to Sartre, existentialist, comprehensive psychoanalysis looks for the origin of acts in the ‘inscription of their purpose 
in the future’, that is in the original choice. The act is conceived as coming from the future towards the present, 
originating in a possible. It is not the future and the present which can be determined starting from the hazy light of 
the past, but the present and the past which will be determined starting from the brightness of the light of the future.  
 
5.2. The phenomenology of knowledge and truth. The method used for understanding the other’s inner world is the 
phenomenological one, which implies putting the world between brackets and entering, hic et nunc, the inner 
universe of the other’s way of feeling. Without instruments and standardised assumptions, through authentic 
listening, empathy, acceptance free of judgement, with a naïve-disciplined attitude (Yalom, 2012). The past is no 
longer a witness layer, to be re-enacted, but a construct of the present context. The constant re-enactment influences 
the context and, implicitly, living the present and relating to the future. The phenomenological world is defined and 
redefined with each new particular life experience, with each existential failure or success, to which meaning and 
explanation are attributed. What matters for the subject is not so much the content of the experience, but its 
significance; not the explanation, as its non-dissonant presence. The explanation brings order and creates the feeling 
of meaning. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The sketch above shows that psychology, even in its therapeutic stance, continues to be dependent on certain 
philosophical assumptions on existence in general and on human condition in particular. This fact does not in any 
way diminish its scientific prestige, and does not single it out by comparison to other sciences, for, as Th. Kuhn 
argued, scientific paradigms are based on foundations which go beyond the actual scientific theories. Scientific 
theories, states Kuhnian epistemology (1965), are always founded on certain implicit metaphysical postulates. In the 
case of psychology, there is a difference of degree, not of nature. 
Many of the contemporary man’s problems are related to the existential contexts, to the difficulty of choice, the use 
of freedom, the way to relate to their fellow kind, isolation and estrangement, to love and deception, to the 
implacable finitude of life and the loss of the meaning of existence. Yet all these existential ‘facts’ are the object of 
philosophical reflection. It is for this reason that lately there has been a rising trend of the practical philosophy 
dealing with philosophical counselling, starting with the German philosopher Gerd Achenbach, the one who opened 
in Koln in 1981 the first philosophical counselling practice and up to Lou Marinoff, the founding president of the 
American Philosophical Practitioners Association, APPA. We do not regard philosophical counselling as an 
alternative to counselling and psychotherapy (Schuster, 1999), but as an essential component of psychological 
counselling and therapy.  For this we feel there is a need for a minimal philosophical training of the psychotherapist, 
both in the period of initial training , and even more so in that of advanced studies. Philosophical counselling stricto 
sensu can successfully complement psychological counselling, operating at the level of the spiritual world, which 
the psychotherapist can hardly take possession of. This way, ‘the worlds’ of the humaneness can be wholly covered, 
the psychiatrist, in the world below (Umwelt), the psychologist, in the intermediate ones (Mitwelt and Eigenwelt), 
and the philosopher, in the world above, (Uberwelt) without there being, of course, any absolute boundaries.  
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